11 ideas
22642 | Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James] |
22641 | Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
22640 | We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |